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Abstract
We analyze optimal discretionary monetary policy in an endoge-
nous sticky prices model. Similar models with exogenous sticky prices
can deliver multiple equilibria. This is a necessary condition for the
occurrence of expectation traps (when private agents￿expectations de-
termine the equilibrium level of in￿ ation). In our model, sticky-price
￿rms are allowed to switch to ￿ exible pricing by paying a random cost.
For plausible parametrizations, our model has a unique low-in￿ ation
equilibrium. With endogenous sticky prices, the monetary author-
ity does not validate high-in￿ ation expectations and deviates to the
Friedman rule.
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11 Introduction
Monetary economics has recently witnessed an upsurge of interest in trying
to identify the causes of the large variation in in￿ ation across countries and
time. One strand of this literature identi￿es expectation traps as a possible
explanation. In an expectation trap scenario, the high-in￿ ation episode of
the 1970s in the US can be characterized as a period in which private agents
expected high in￿ ation. Based on these expectations, private agents took
actions to shield themselves from high in￿ ation. For example, households re-
duced their savings, anticipating a lower real return, and workers demanded
higher nominal wages, expecting them to be worth less in real terms. The pri-
vate sector￿ s action in response to high expected in￿ ation created a dilemma
for the Fed: validate private agents￿expectations and deliver high in￿ ation
or frustrate the high-in￿ ation expectations with a tight monetary policy and
accept a recession. The Fed chose the ￿rst course of action. In contrast,
the 1990s can be interpreted as a period of low-in￿ ation expectations, which
determined a low level of actual in￿ ation. In an expectation trap scenario,
the lack of commitment adds to the in￿ ation bias discussed in Kydland and
Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) the costs of high and variable
in￿ ation driven by expectations, independently from economic fundamentals.
A necessary condition for expectation traps to exist is multiplicity of
equilibria. Albanesi et al. (2003) use a cash-credit goods model ￿ la Lu-
cas and Stokey (1987) to show that multiple equilibria are possible in a
no-commitment optimal monetary policy framework. The key assumption
behind the multiplicity of equilibria is that some ￿rms cannot adjust their
prices in response to changes in monetary policy. In this paper we relax
this assumption. We argue that if sticky-prices ￿rms are allowed to pay
menu costs to reoptimize, such costs have to be implausibly high to support
multiple equilibria.
In Albanesi et al. (2003) the monetary authority is benevolent, and weighs
the bene￿ts and costs of in￿ ation, maximizing the utility of the representative
agent. Firms have market power and produce an ine¢ ciently low level of
output. Some ￿rms are assumed to set their prices before the monetary
authority￿ s actions. The monetary authority has an incentive to generate
in￿ ation to increase output, forcing sticky-price ￿rms to produce more. The
marginal bene￿t of in￿ ation is roughly constant across in￿ ation levels. The
representative household faces a cash-in-advance constraint on some of the
goods it purchases. In order to buy cash goods it has to hold money and
give up the interest it could earn from buying bonds. A positive interest rate
distorts the allocation between cash and credit goods. The marginal cost of
2in￿ ation can be lower than the marginal bene￿t both for low and high values
of in￿ ation. This can generate multiple equilibria. Albanesi et al. (2003)
illustrate this possibility with numerical examples.
The assumption that some ￿rms cannot protect themselves in any way
from the monetary authority￿ s actions is reasonable for economies with low
and stable in￿ ation. With high and volatile in￿ ation, ￿rms have strong
incentives to revise their prices. We allow sticky-price ￿rms to revise their
prices by paying a random ￿xed cost.1 Firms with a cost lower than the
expected gain will revise their price. If it is so costly to revise prices that
no ￿rm would do so, independently of the monetary authority￿ s actions, our
model simpli￿es to the model of Albanesi et al. (2003).2
In our model, in a candidate equilibrium, sticky- and ￿ exible-price ￿rms
post the same price. Hence, in a candidate equilibrium, sticky-price ￿rms do
not revise their price even if they have a chance to do so and the degree of
price stickiness in our economy is the same as in Albanesi et al. (2003). How-
ever, o⁄ equilibrium, sticky-price ￿rms have incentives to revise their price
by paying a menu cost. This opens the door to a pro￿table deviation for
the government from the supposed equilibrium. By deviating to the Fried-
man rule, the monetary authority can eliminate the distortion between cash
and credit goods. At the same time, the relative price of sticky-price goods
is high. If sticky-price ￿rms cannot protect themselves from the monetary
authority￿ s deviation, the distorted allocation between ￿ exible- and sticky-
price goods makes the deviation to the Friedman rule too costly, and the
high-in￿ ation is indeed an equilibrium. If enough sticky-price ￿rms would
reoptimize in response, the cost of deviating to the Friedman rule, and dis-
torting the allocations across sticky- and ￿ exible-price goods, is smaller than
the gain. In this case our model has a unique low-in￿ ation equilibrium.
For the high-in￿ ation equilibrium to exist under the benchmark parame-
trization of Albanesi et al. (2003), about ten percent of ￿rms in our economy
should have menu costs such that they would not change their price even for
a 3,650 percent increase in pro￿ts. For the parametrization most favorable
to the existence of multiple equilibria, the high-in￿ ation equilibrium can be
supported if 7 percent of all ￿rms have menu costs that would prevent them
from repotimizing when facing a three-fold increase in their pro￿ts. Menu
costs this large are orders of magnitude greater than what empirical work
1Several authors have studied models with state-dependent pricing. See, for example,
Ireland (1997), Dotsey et al. (1999), and Burstein (2006).
2If it is so cheap to revise prices that all ￿rms do, our model boils down to a ￿ exible
prices model.
3suggests.3
In a related paper Siu (2006) endogenizes sticky prices in the model of
King and Wolman (2004)4 and reaches similar conclusions. With reasonable
price-revision costs and small in￿ ation costs unrelated to price stickiness,5
there is a unique low-in￿ ation equilibrium.
Section 2 describes the model with endogenous sticky prices. In Section
3 we explore the properties of our models with numerical examples. We
perform sensitivity analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present the economy￿ s environment, we describe the agents￿
problems, and we de￿ne and characterize equilibria.
2.1 Environment
Our model is populated by households, ￿rms, and a monetary authority.
There is a continuum of ￿rms, each one producing a variety of goods as a
monopolist.
The timing is as follows:
￿ a fraction ￿ of ￿rms set their prices (P e is the average price chosen);
￿ the monetary authority chooses its policy to maximize the utility of
the representative household;
￿ each sticky-price ￿rm draws a realization of the adjustment cost from
a uniform distribution, U[0;b];
￿ each sticky-price ￿rm decides whether to revise its price by comparing
the cost and the bene￿t;
￿ all the remaining private decisions are made.
The state of the economy, from the monetary authority￿ s perspective, is
given by the average price level set by the sticky-price ￿rms. The money
3See Levy et al. (1997) and Bils and Klenow (2004).
4See King and Wolman (2004) for a discussion of the di⁄erences between their model
and Albanesi et al. (2003).
5Due to the di⁄erence in timing, in our model in￿ ation is costly independently of the
degree of price rigidity.
4growth rate is denoted by x and the corresponding policy rule by X (P e).
The state of the economy, after the monetary authority decision and the
realization of the policy, shock is (P e;x).
2.2 Households
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where ct denotes aggregate consumption, composed of individual con-
sumption goods ct (!) aggregated according to (2), and nt denotes hours
worked. The parameter ￿ pins down the elasticity of substitution between
individual goods, 1
1￿￿: The preferences parameters have the usual interpreta-
tion: ￿ is the discount factor,   is a scale parameter pinning down the hours
worked-to-leisure ratio in equilibrium, and ￿ is the coe¢ cient of relative risk
aversion.
The household faces the following constraints6:
ct (!) ￿ 0 8i; 0 ￿ nt ￿ 1; (3)
M + B ￿ A; (4)
P





e￿1c11 + ^ P (1 ￿ ￿1)c12
i
+ (1 ￿ z)
h
P
e￿2c21 + ^ P (1 ￿ ￿2)c22
i
￿
Wn + RB + M + (x ￿ 1) + D + T: (6)
Here, z is the fraction of cash goods, c11 and c12 are the quantities of
cash goods purchased from sticky- and ￿ exible-price ￿rms, c21 and c22 are
the quantities of credit goods purchased from sticky- and ￿ exible-price ￿rms.
The measures of sticky-price ￿rms producing cash goods and credit goods
are denoted by ￿1 and ￿2, respectively. The aggregate nominal stock of
money at the beginning of each period is normalized to 1. The household
6All nominal variables are scaled by the aggregate money supply; A0 is scaled by next
period￿ s aggregate money supply.
5can split its assets, A, into money and bonds ￿ M and B, respectively. The
gross nominal interest rate is denoted by R and the money growth rate by x.
Constraint (5) states that, in order to buy cash goods, the household has to
hold cash. Inequality (6) is the budget constraint. The-left hand side repre-
sents expenses for buying assets and goods. The right-hand side represents
the household￿ s revenues, stemming from labor income, interest on bonds,
beginning of period￿ s money, injections of money from the government, div-
idends from ￿rms, and lump-sum taxes (transfers) from the government.
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where uij denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to cij, un denotes the
partial derivative of u with respect to n, and v1 denotes the partial derivative
of v with respect to its ￿rst argument.
The cash-in-advance constraint can be rewritten as zP e [￿1c11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)c12] ￿
1, and it is binding for R > 1:
f1 ￿ zP
e [￿1c11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)c12]g(R ￿ 1) = 0: (9)
2.3 Firms
Each ￿rm ! 2 (0;1) has a production function y (!) = ￿n(!), where n(!) is
employment and ￿ represents the marginal productivity of labor. Firms set
6prices as mark-ups over marginal costs:
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e =












c11 = (1 ￿ ￿)P
ec11;
￿12 = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Pc12; ￿21 = (1 ￿ ￿)P
ec21; ￿22 = (1 ￿ ￿) ^ Pc22:
The gain for sticky-price ￿rms from revising their price is:
￿i = ￿i2 ￿ ￿i1, i = 1;2:
All ￿rms for which the realized cost is smaller than ￿i will revise their
price. The marginal cash-good and credit-good ￿rms revising their price are
determined by ^ ￿i = min[￿i=b;￿] i = 1;2. The number of sticky-price ￿rms
will be given by the fraction of ￿rms that were sticky minus those who choose
to adjust their price:
￿i = ￿ ￿ ^ ￿i; i = 1;2: (12)
2.4 Monetary Authority
The monetary authority chooses the current money growth rate, x, taking
as given future monetary policies and the private sector allocations, in order





where v (:) is the household￿ s value function.
2.5 Government
The government runs a balanced budget by ￿nancing exogenous public spend-
ing, g, with lump sum taxes, ￿ = g. Furthermore, the government rebates the
price revision costs (collected from sticky-price ￿rms choosing to reoptimize)
to the households in a lump sum fashion.
72.6 Equilibria
De￿nition 1 A private sector equilibrium, given a monetary policy rule
X (P e) and a current money growth rate x, is a collection of functions
P e, ^ P (P e;x), W (P e;x); v (A;P e;x); n(A;P e;x), cij (A;P e;x) j;i = 1;2;
M (A;P e;x), A0 (A;P e;x), R(P e;x) such that:
￿ n; M; A0; fci;jgi;j=1;2 solve the household￿ s problem (7);
￿ ￿rms optimize, i.e., they set prices according to (10) and (11);




e;x) = 1; M (1;P
e;x) = 1;
g + z [￿1c11 + (1 ￿ ￿1)c12] + (1 ￿ z)[￿2c21 + (1 ￿ ￿2)c22] = ￿n:
De￿nition 2 A Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium and a
monetary policy rule such that X (P e) solves (13):
2.6.1 Characterizing Equilibria
The policy can be characterized as a choice of the price of credit goods ^ P, or
equivalently of the relative price q =
^ P
Pe; rather than a choice of the money
growth rate x.7 Since q does not a⁄ect future allocations, the monetary









A Markov equilibrium corresponds to P e = ^ P, or equivalently to q = 1.
Notice that, as in Albanesi et al. (2003), the ￿rst-order conditions to (14)
are only necessary for an equilibrium. In practice, the monetary authority
objective function has to be checked globally to rule out possible pro￿table
deviations from the candidate equilibria identi￿ed by the ￿rst-order condi-
tions.
Our model boils down to the model of Albanesi et al. (2003) for b !
+1, i.e., ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ 8q. If it is prohibitively costly to revise prices,
7Alternatively, policy can be characterized as a choice of the nominal interest rate R
as in Albanesi et al. (2003).
8no ￿rms choose to do so, and the degree of price stickiness can be thought
of as exogenous. For b ! 0 our economy has ￿ exible prices and a unique
equilibrium in which the Friedman rule is the optimal policy.














In equilibrium, sticky- and ￿ exible-price ￿rms make the same pro￿ts:
￿2jq=1 = ￿1jq=1 = 0. Thus in internal equilibria, no ￿rms will choose to
revise their prices and ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿.
For q 6= 1, monetary authority decisions can induce positive pro￿ts di⁄er-
ential and a⁄ect the degree of price stickiness in the economy. Credit-goods
￿rms with sticky prices have a bigger incentive to reoptimize, since they face
a higher demand, which is positively related to the interest rate (R ￿ 1),
i.e., ￿2 ￿ ￿1. This implies that more credit-goods ￿rms revise their price
(^ ￿2 ￿ ^ ￿1) and that the degree of price stickiness is lower for credit-goods
producers (￿2 ￿ ￿1).
The candidate equilibria in our model for b 2 (0;+1) are di⁄erent from
those in the model of Albanesi et al. (2003). The monetary authority takes
into account the e⁄ect of its decision on the degree of stickiness in the econ-
omy. In particular, this a⁄ects the possibility of pro￿table deviations. We
illustrate this point in the following section.
3 Computing Equilibria
In this section we explore the properties of our model for intermediate values
of b using numerical examples and perform sensitivity analysis.
We compute the equilibria, setting the fraction of credit goods, the upper
bound on the fraction of sticky-price ￿rms, productivity, government spend-















9z ￿ ￿ g ￿  
0.15 0.1 1 0.05 0.45 1
Table 1: Benchmark model: parameter values.
ing,9 and the utility parameters10 to the same values as in Albanesi et al.
(2003), reported in Table 1.
Figure 1 portrays the monetary authority￿ s objective function for the low-
in￿ ation candidate equilibrium, as a function of b and q. Notice that for any
b, the maximum utility is achieved for q = 1. In words, in our model the
low-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Changes in b
have a second-order e⁄ect on the allocations (see Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows the utility surface corresponding to the high-in￿ ation can-
didate equilibrium. For any b, a local maximum is achieved at q = 1. Again,
the allocations for corresponding to q = 1 do not change much as b decreases
(Figure 4). However, for a su¢ ciently small b, the monetary authority￿ s abil-
ity to tinker with the economy￿ s degree of stickiness generates a pro￿table
deviation. Playing the lowest possible q compatible with the non-negativity
constraint on the interest rate delivers a higher utility than at the local
optimum q = 1. That is, for a low enough b the high-in￿ ation candidate
equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium. Figure 5 compares the allocations
at the local maximum q = 1 (gray dotted lines) with the allocations at the
global maximum (solid black lines), as functions of b. For b < b￿ = 25;375:39,
the endogeneity of sticky prices induces a pro￿table deviation. Notice that
the deviation involves lowering the interest rate as much as possible (R = 1).
When the government deviates to the Friedman rule, it increases the relative
price of sticky-price goods, i.e. lowers q: The bene￿t of such a deviation is
the elimination of the distortion between cash and credit goods and does not
depend on b. The cost, which is the distortion between sticky and ￿ exible
￿rms, declines as b declines. The lower b is, the higher the fraction of ￿rms
that reset their prices and the lower the fraction of ￿rms that produce at
highly ine¢ cient levels.
At b￿, around 1 percent of the ￿rms which originally had sticky prices pay
the price-revision cost and switch to ￿ exible pricing. The gains from resetting
prices will be 3,650 percent increase in pro￿ts. In order to sustain the high-
9Notice that normalizing ￿ to 1 makes it a super￿ ous parameter. Also, setting govern-
ment spending to zero would have minor e⁄ects on all the results. The only reason we
retain these parameters is for ease of comparison with Albanesi et al. (2003).
10Given the static nature of problem (14), ￿ does not a⁄ect any of the results. We chose
￿ = 0 in what follows.
10in￿ ation equilibrium, the distribution of the menu costs should be such that
99 percent of the sticky-price ￿rms have menu costs higher than 3,650 percent
of their pro￿ts. To put these numbers in perspective, note that Levy et al.
(1997) put the average cost of price adjustment for U.S. supermarket chains
to 0.7 percent of revenues, while the calibration of the menu cost function in
Golosov and Lucas (2007), based on Klenow and Kryvstov (2005), implies
that the average cost of price adjustment is 0.5 percent of total revenues.
4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we explore how b￿ and the corresponding degree of price stick-
iness change as ￿ (the initial degree of price stickiness) and z (the fraction of
cash goods) vary. We consider the two values of z in Albanesi et al. (2003).
For z = 0:13 the range of ￿ for which the exogenous sticky prices model
admits multiple equilibria is [0:086;0:135]; the corresponding range of ￿ for
z = 0:15 is [0:0993;0:129].
Figure 6 displays b￿, the lowest value of b for which the high-in￿ ation
candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium, as a function of the initial measure of
sticky-price ￿rms for the two values of z we consider. The higher is the initial
degree of price stickiness in our model, the more robust is the high-in￿ ation
candidate equilibrium. For the highest values of ￿ for which the high-in￿ ation
equilibriumexists, the value of b￿ is 123, for z = 0:15 and 108, for z = 0:13. At
these values of b￿ the government is indi⁄erent between deviating to Friedman
rule or validating the expectations and delivering q = 1: The gains for sticky-
price ￿rms from resetting their prices remain extremely high (see Figure 7):
about 264 percent (if z = 0:15) and 300 percent (if z = 0:13).
Figure 8 displays the degree of price stickiness that the monetary author-
ity￿ s deviation from the high-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium would induce.
The higher ￿ is, the lower the degree of stickiness associated to a pro￿table
deviation. In order for the high-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium to be an equi-
librium the distribution of menu costs should be such that at least 7 (8.3)
percent of all ￿rms in the economy face a menu cost higher 300 (264) percent
of their pro￿ts for z = 0:13 (z = 0:5). These values are orders of magnitude
higher then those estimated by Levy et al. (1997) or inferred by Golosov and
Lucas (2007).
115 Conclusions
The expectation traps hypothesis has been advocated in the literature as
a possible explanation for episodes of high in￿ ation. Albanesi et al. (2003)
present a model where the expectation trap is sprung by sticky-price ￿rms
posting high prices because of high expected in￿ ation. We generalize their
model by allowing sticky-price ￿rms to revise their price in response to the
monetary authority￿ s action by paying a menu cost. For reasonable parame-
trizations, our model has a unique low-in￿ ation equilibrium.
In response to high in￿ ation, lowering the interest rate would eliminate
the distortion between cash and credit goods. In Albanesi et al. (2003) sticky-
price ￿rms would remain stuck with high prices and the resulting distortion in
the allocations is so costly as to support a high-in￿ ation equilibrium. In our
model, the allocation distortion cost is undone by sticky-price ￿rms becoming
￿ exible pricers and deviating to the Friedman rule is optimal.
In our model, the possibility for ￿rms to protect themselves against high
in￿ ation by revising their pricing decision unwinds the expectation trap. This
rules out episodes of high in￿ ation driven by non-fundamental uncertainty.
However, the lack of commitment is still costly because it induces the mon-
etary authority to deliver higher-than-optimal in￿ ation.
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14Figure 1: Monetary authority￿ s objective function in the low-in￿ ation equi-
librium.























































Figure 2: Allocations in the low-in￿ ation equilibrium.
15Figure 3: Monetary authority￿ s objective function in the high-in￿ ation can-
didate equilibrium.























































Figure 4: Allocations in the high-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium.



































































Figure 5: Allocations in the high-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium (gray) and
allocations corresponding to the maximum utility for the monetary authority
(black).













Figure 6: Minimum level of the upper bound of the price revision distribution
consistent with multiple equilibria: z = 0:13 (gray) and z = 0:15 (black).








































Figure 7: Pro￿t di⁄erential in percentage for the marginal price-revising ￿rm
at b￿: z = 0:13 (gray) and z = 0:15 (black).

















Figure 8: Degree of price stickiness corresponding to a monetary authority￿ s
deviation from the high-in￿ ation candidate equilibrium: z = 0:13 (gray) and
z = 0:15 (black).
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